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Smoking has been decreasing steadily over the past 
several decades, but advertisers still target some populations for 
cigarette consumption.  Currently, almost nine out of ten African 
American smokers smoke mentholated cigarettes compared to 
only one in four White Americans.  This disparity in use came 
about through decades of targeted marketing efforts on the part 
of tobacco companies.  Mentholated cigarettes are more addictive 
than unflavored cigarettes and lead to more lifelong smoking.  
Because menthol smokers have a harder time quitting, civil 
rights and public health advocates have long viewed the 
marketing practices of menthol cigarette makers as a racial 
injustice.  This Note substantiates this notion by comparing 
racially targeted marketing of menthol to the racial targeting 
practices in the subprime mortgage market.  In housing crisis-era 
cases centered on Fair Housing Act claims, courts found that 
targeting minorities to purchase predatory home loans was a 
civil rights violation.  Drawing on reverse redlining jurisprudence 
under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act, this Note proposes a statutory provision that would prohibit 
racially targeted marketing of mentholated cigarettes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The widespread decrease in smoking and tobacco use 
over the past fifty years has been one of the United States’ 
greatest public health victories.  Between the 1960’s and now, 
the share of Americans who smoke has dropped from over forty 
percent to almost fifteen percent,1 which has driven down 
tobacco-related disease.  This massive reduction in smoking has 
preserved the lives of over 800,000 Americans who, through 
smoking, would have succumbed to lung cancer.2  In honor of 
these gains, the Center for Disease Control counts tobacco 
regulation as a crowning public health achievement.3 
While these public health strides have been remarkable, 
the gains in smoking reduction have been distributed unequally 
                                               
1 Brady Dennis, Who Still Smokes in the United States—In Seven 




2 Nearly 800,000 Deaths Prevented Due to Declines in Smoking, 
NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.nih.gov/news-events 
/news-releases/nearly-800000-deaths-prevented-due-declines-smoking [https 
://perma.cc/GCN3-P9PU]. 
3 Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 2001–2010, 
CDC: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (May 20, 2011), https://www.cdc. 
gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6019a5.htm [https://perma.cc/XLU8-3JD3]. 
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across demographics.  For example, low-income Americans and 
Native Americans have disproportionately high smoking rates.4  
Smoking rates are the same between African Americans and 
Whites.5  Still, African Americans suffer from more tobacco-
related disease6 and mortality.7 
Smoking behavior and preferences are also different 
across demographics where smoking rates might be equal.  In 
particular, African American smokers overwhelmingly smoke 
menthol cigarettes, which are tobacco cigarettes flavored with 
the compound menthol.  Menthol cigarettes have survived the 
mass tort litigation against tobacco companies and federal 
tobacco regulation that troubled the tobacco industry more 
broadly.  Currently, almost nine out of ten Black8 smokers prefer 
menthol.9  This difference in use is troubling and is in fact a 
driver of health disparities.  Though menthol itself does not make 
cigarettes more toxic, the additive does make cigarettes easier to 
start smoking and harder to quit.10  
The fact that more minorities smoke a more addictive 
product can be traced to racially targeted marketing campaigns 
                                               
4 Burden of Tobacco Use in the U.S., CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/to 
bacco/campaign/tips/resources/data/cigarette-smoking-in-united-states.html 
[https://perma.cc/6GET-JSMH] (last updated Feb. 25, 2019).  
5 Tobacco Use in Racial and Ethnic Populations, AM. Lᴜɴɢ ASS’N, 
http://www.lung.org/stop-smoking/smoking-facts/tobacco-use-racial-and-
ethnic.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/62F3-7CF5] 
(last updated Feb. 20, 2019).  
6 See Pebbles Fagan et al., Eliminating Tobacco-Related Health 
Disparities: Directions for Future Research, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 211 (2004) 
(discussing health disparities in tobacco-related diseases among groups in the 
United States).   
7 See Jessica Y. Ho & Irma T. Elo, The Contribution of Smoking to 
Black-White Differences in U.S. Mortality, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 545 (2013) 
(examining the contribution of smoking-attributable deaths to mortality trends 
among African Americans).   
8 This Note will use the terms “African American” and “Black” in-
terchangeably.  Though the author recognizes that these descriptors are not 
truly interchangeable, they will be used as such because the data and other 
research referenced do not distinguish between the two. 
9 African Americans and Tobacco Use, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
tobacco/disparities/african-americans/index.htm [https://perma.cc/BS3T-F7 
5Y] (last updated Mar. 7, 2018). 
10 See Nadine Kabbani, Not so Cool? Menthol’s Discovered Actions 
on the Nicotinic Receptor and Its Implications for Nicotine Addiction, 4 
FRONTIERS PHARMACOLOGY 95 (2013) (examining how menthol increases the 
addictiveness of cigarettes).  
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that began in the 1950’s.11  To this day, menthol cigarette makers 
inundate minority communities with advertisements while 
barely touching White markets.  This targeting has created a 
disparate harm in public health, but current legal tools in 
tobacco regulation do not specifically address the civil rights 
injuries wrought by menthol cigarette makers’ hyper-focus on 
African American populations and mentholated cigarettes’ 
persistence in the tobacco market.  This topic has been covered 
extensively in public health scholarship, where researchers 
express the intuition that tobacco companies’ targeted adver-
tising on the basis of race is unjust and exacerbates societal 
inequalities.  This Note articulates those intuitions in legal terms 
by describing the harms of targeted marketing as civil rights 
injuries and by analogizing the marketing practices of menthol 
cigarette makers to the unlawful discriminatory behavior of 
lenders in the housing and credit sectors.  While the practice of 
targeting certain goods at specific kinds of consumers is at the 
core of advertising, post-financial crisis cases about subprime 
lending show that racially targeted marketing can be harmful to 
minorities.  This Note draws on law from subprime lending 
because it is one area where legislators and courts have es-
tablished that targeting minorities for certain kinds of products 
is unlawful.  
Part II of this Note will describe the racial disparity in 
menthol tobacco use, and parallel disparities in tobacco-related 
diseases, as a civil rights problem.  It will also investigate the 
substantial history of menthol companies’ targeting of African 
Americans.  Part III will explore tools that have been used to 
regulate cigarettes, including tort litigation, legislation, agency 
regulation, and civil rights litigation.  It will also explain how 
each of the tools fails to reach the discrimination problem in 
racially targeted marketing of menthol.  Lastly, Part IV will 
explore how two consumer protection statutes––the Fair 
Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act—have been 
interpreted to create liability for affirmative marketing of 
certain products based on race, especially in the aftermath of the 
subprime lending peak and the housing crisis.  This Note will 
draw on those statutes to propose a federal statutory framework 
                                               
11 See Joshua Rising & Lori Alexander, Marketing of Menthol 
Cigarettes and Consumer Perceptions, 9 TOBACCO INDUCED DISEASES S2 
(2011) (discussing the role that marketing plays in a consumer’s perception 
of menthol). 
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that would create civil rights liabilities for racially targeted 
marketing of menthol tobacco products. 
 
II. MENTHOL ADDITIVES’ ROLE IN THE DISPARITIES IN 
TOBACCO USE AND TOBACCO-RELATED DISEASE 
While the percentage of African American adults who 
smoke is about equal to the share of White Americans who 
smoke, African American smokers overwhelmingly prefer 
menthol cigarettes.  Almost nine out of ten African Americans 
smoke menthol, whereas only twenty-five percent of Whites 
share that preference.12  Menthol cigarettes themselves can be 
more harmful than non-mentholated cigarettes because they 
are more addictive, and African Americans overwhelmingly 
suffer the consequences from consuming a more addictive 
product. 
 
A. Targeted Marketing  
Journalists and academics have extensively covered the 
racially targeted marketing practices of menthol cigarette 
makers, and tobacco companies in general, over the past 
several decades.  Starting in the 1940’s, tobacco companies 
sought to develop an African American consumer base for their 
products, relying on political connections, cultural figures, 
African American media, and even civil rights leaders to 
generate support for—or at least temper hostility towards—
cigarette smoking.13  In the majority of cases, the tobacco com-
panies were trying to push mentholated cigarettes on minority 
groups.  
It should be noted at the outset that there is no racially 
endemic preference for, or aversion to, mentholated cigarettes.  
That is, prior to menthol cigarette makers’ pursuit of African 
American smokers, African Americans were not drawn to 
menthol to a significantly greater extent than White smokers.  
                                               
12 Stephanie Saul, Black Lawmakers Seek Restrictions on Menthol 
Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/ 
business/01menthol.html [https://perma.cc/G4B8-SMX3]. 
13 See Phillip S. Gardiner, The African Americanization of Menthol 
Cigarette Use in the United States, 6 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. S55 (2004) 
(examining the social factors that contribute to the disproportionate use of 
menthol cigarettes among African Americans).   
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Philip Morris commissioned a survey in 1953 to assess appetite 
for menthol cigarettes, finding that two percent of White 
Americans, and five percent of African Americans, preferred 
Kools, an existing menthol brand.14  Phillip Gardiner, a public 
health scholar, argues that tobacco companies magnified this 
small gap in consumer preference with decades of targeted 
advertising and relationship building, leading to the racial 
disparities in menthol cigarette consumption that we see 
today.15  
Tobacco companies first tried to tap into minority 
markets by networking with African American community 
groups and civil rights organizations in the late 1950’s and 
early 1960’s.  The tactic was to align the tobacco industry with 
the growing civil rights movement and argue that such align-
ment grew naturally from the industry’s practice of employing 
African Americans (first as farm workers and then as sales-
people) at a time when few other industries did the same.16  
Executives at Philip Morris volunteered with and supported 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
Peoples (NAACP), the National Urban League (NUL), and the 
United Negro College Fund (UNCF).17  With these relationships 
in place, tobacco companies were able to recruit salespeople 
from within the Black community and, in turn, strengthen their 
performance with Black smokers.18 
Menthol cigarette makers in particular delicately in-
serted themselves into the civil rights dialogue in the 1960’s 
as a way of capitalizing on the new cultural progression of Black 
identity that was distinct from White culture.  An internal 
marketing analysis from R.J. Reynolds, the maker of Newport 
menthols, shows that the industry had the objective of making 
menthols the choice product for African Americans:  
 
                                               
14 Id. at S59. 
15 Id.  
16 See Chronology of Philip Morris Policy of Equal Opportunity and 
Involvement in the Black Community (Dec. 24, 1987) [hereinafter Philip 
Morris], https://www.industrydocumentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id= 
nxkg0089 [https://perma.cc/QF4M-73S5]; see also Diane S. Burrows, Younger 
Adult Strategies and Opportunities (Feb. 17, 1984), http://legacy.library. 
ucsf.edu/tid/ene39d00 [https://perma.cc/NC2Q-9FKR].  
17 V. B. Yerger & R. E. Malone, African American Leadership Groups: 
Smoking with the Enemy, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 336, 337 (2002).     
18 Id.   
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It was time for Blacks to build their own brand 
in the 1960s, the heyday of Martin Luther King 
and “Black pride.”  The strategy for exploiting 
this phenomenon was simple: Kool apparently 
capitalized on this aspect of the 1960s by simply 
advertising to Blacks before its competitors did.  
Kool ads were in Ebony consistently from at 
least 1962 . . . .  Kool became “cool” and, by the 
early 1970s, had a 56% share among younger 
adult Blacks—it was the Black Marlboro.19 
 
Brown and Williamson, the makers of Kool, exploited multiple 
media avenues to reach African American consumers.  In 
addition to advertising in Ebony, Brown and Williamson ran 
advertisements in African American newspapers and on radio 
and television stations with significant African American 
audiences.20  By 1965, tobacco advertising in magazines was 
almost thoroughly racially segmented, with advertisements in 
Ebony featuring African American models and professional 
athletes and advertisements in Life featuring White models 
almost exclusively.21 
The tobacco industry added another targeted marketing 
tactic to its portfolio starting in the 1970’s, which was marketing 
through music genres popular with African Americans.  In 
1975, Kool sponsored the Kool Jazz Festival as a way to reach 
its target audience when it felt that other media opportunities 
were insufficient.22  In the 1980’s, Brown and Williamson’s music 
sponsorship operations expanded into hip hop and nightclubs, 
where the company would distribute free samples of menthol 
cigarettes to inner city youth through disc jockeys and van 
drivers who could localize Brown and Williamson’s efforts and 
“defend Kool’s strong Black franchise.”23  The menthol cigarette 
companies recognized that sponsoring music events was a 
                                               
19 Stacey J. Anderson, Marketing of Menthol Cigarettes and Consumer 
Perceptions: A Review of Tobacco Industry Documents, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 
ii20, ii22 (2011) (footnote omitted); Philip Morris, supra note 16.  
20 Navid Hafez & Pamela M. Ling, Finding the Kool Mixx: How Brown 
& Williamson Used Music Marketing to Sell Cigarettes, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 
359, 360 (2006).   
21 Richard W. Pollay et al., Separate, but Not Equal: Racial 
Segmentation in Cigarette Advertising, 21 J. ADVERT. 45, 51 (1992).  
22 Hafez & Ling, supra note 20, at 359. 
23 Id. at 361. 
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form of indirect advertising.24  Menthol cigarette companies 
continued to focus on African Americans in standard advertising 
mediums during this time.  Between 1984 and 1985, over sixty-
five percent of the cigarette advertisements in publications 
with African American readership—such as Ebony, Jet, and 
Essence—were for mentholated cigarettes, compared to only 
about fifteen percent of cigarette advertisements in White or 
general interest magazines.25 
Menthol makers were implementing these culture-based 
marketing initiatives at a time when public awareness of the 
harms of smoking was growing.  In the late 1980’s, sellers of 
mentholated cigarettes were concerned that they were losing 
some customers to the “polarization” of the African American 
consumer base into an elite class and an “underclass.”  One 
company, R.J. Reynolds, decided to focus its marketing efforts 
on the “underclass,” members of which would “simply have more 
pressing concerns than smoking issues”—that is, more pressing 
than their own health.26 
Tobacco companies led a parallel indirect advertising 
effort by deepening their relationships with community and 
advocacy groups that served lower-income African Americans.  
In the 1980’s, R.J. Reynolds made extraordinary contributions 
to the NAACP’s Special Contribution Fund in exchange for 
public support; by 1990, the company was placing its corporate 
logo on billboards advertising services provided by the National 
Urban League.27  Tobacco companies had also formed connec-
                                               
24 Tobacco companies advertised their menthol brands through music 
sponsorship well past the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998.  In the 
early 2000’s, Brown & Williamson ran the Kool Mixx campaign, in which 
the company linked itself to hip hop music and culture in an attempt to deepen 
its reach in the African American community and target African American 
youth.  See id.  The campaign included a music festival featuring artists such 
as the Roots and Erykah Badu, a D.J. competition, and free hip hop CDs.  
See id.  In 2004, several states sued Brown & Williamson to enforce the Master 
Settlement Agreement's provisions banning youth marketing.  See id.  A New 
York state court issued a restraining order enjoining much of the campaign 
in 2004.  See id.   
25 K. Michael Cummings et al., Cigarette Advertising and Black-White 
Differences in Brand Preference, 102 PUB. HEALTH REP. 698, 699 (1987).   
26 Anderson, supra note 19, at ii25.  
27 Yerger & Malone, supra note 17, at 337.  For example, Brown & 
Williamson, the makers of Kool, entered into a “fair share agreement” with the 
NAACP, through which the tobacco company promised to generate revenue 
for minority-owned stores and rely on minority-owned advertising and mar-
keting companies.  Id.  Brown & Williamson internal documents show what the 
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tions with politicians in the Congressional Black Caucus and 
state associations of Black legislators.28  The tobacco industry 
influenced politicians to prevent the passage of laws unfavorable 
to the industry, leveraging their relationships with groups like 
the NAACP in policy debates.29  
Direct advertising continued alongside indirect mar-
keting.  Throughout the 1990’s, minority neighborhoods were 
saturated with billboards advertising mentholated cigarettes.30  
By 1993, Brown and Williamson’s own internal assessment 
found that “Blacks are three times as likely to smoke menthol 
and four times as likely to smoke full revenue menthol compared 
to non-Blacks.”31  Between 1998 and 2002, readers of Ebony 
were nine times as likely to encounter a menthol advertisement 
as readers of People.32 
Mentholated cigarette makers have continued their 
racially targeted marketing practices into the present day in 
spite of serious obstacles.  After the settlements from tobacco 
tort lawsuits (discussed in Part III) drastically curbed 
television and outdoor marketing, most tobacco marketing 
                                               
company hoped to gain through the agreement: “Clearly, the sole reason for 
B&W’s interest in the [B]lack and Hispanic communities is the actual and 
potential sales of B&W products within these communities and the profitability 
of these sales . . . this relatively small and often tightly knit [minority] 
community can work to B&W’s marketing advantage, if exploited properly.”  
Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Coordination between tobacco companies and minority-focused 
organizations was a formidable tool in defeating anti-tobacco policies.  In the 
1980’s, when the federal government was considering an excise tax on ciga-
rettes, tobacco companies relied on their partnerships with groups like the 
NAACP and vocally cast the tax proposal as a regressive tax on minorities.  
Again, internal documents reflected different concerns.  A Philip Morris 
marketing memorandum emphasized that defeating the excise tax was a 
priority because the price increases on cigarettes through excise taxes would 
prevent young people from starting to smoke and forming a smoking habit.  
The company estimated that an excise tax would rob Philip Morris of the 
business of over 400,000 would-be smokers.  Yerger & Malone, supra note 17, 
at 339–40.  
30 Diana P. Hackbarth et al., Tobacco and Alcohol Billboards in 50 
Chicago Neighborhoods: Market Segmentation to Sell Dangerous Products 
to the Poor, 16 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 213, 218 (1995).  
31 Anderson, supra note 19, at ii25. 
32 Rising & Alexander, supra note 11, at 4. 
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shifted to capture consumers at the point of sale.33  Mentholated 
cigarette makers direct their targeting efforts hyper-locally, 
focusing on majority-minority and inner city neighborhoods.  A 
2011 study of tobacco advertising around California high schools 
found that as the proportion of Black students at a school 
increased by ten percentage points, the odds of encountering 
a Newport advertisement increased by fifty percent.34  Similar 
results were found in a study that observed the location of 
point-of-sale menthol advertisements with respect to race.35  
Promotional discounts for mentholated cigarettes also tend to 
make the product much cheaper in minority and low-income 
neighborhoods.36  Surveys of former smokers indicate that the 
exposure to point-of-sale tobacco marketing prompted impulse 
purchases of cigarettes and undercut quit attempts.37  As 
recently as 2013, African American youth are three times more 
likely than children from other demographics to recognize 
advertisements for Newport.38 
 
                                               
33 See Mohammad Siahpush et al., Social Disparities in Exposure 
to Point-of-Sale Cigarette Marketing, 13 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 
1263, 1263 (2016) (“In 2013, tobacco companies spent $8.9 billion on cigarette 
marketing.  About 89% of this expenditure was made at the point of sale (POS) 
in the following three marketing areas: cigarette pack displays, advertisements, 
and promotional and price incentives for consumers.” (footnote omitted)).  
34 Lisa Henriksen et al., Targeted Advertising, Promotion, and Price 
for Menthol Cigarettes in California High School Neighborhoods, 14 NICOTINE 
& TOBACCO RES. 116, 116 (2012). 
35 See Sarah Moreland-Russell, Disparities and Menthol Marketing: 
Additional Evidence in Support of Point of Sale Policies, 10 INT’L J. ENVTL. 
RES. & PUB. HEALTH 4571, 4579 (2013) (“[A] greater percent of retailers with 
menthol marketing near candy were located in census tracts with the highest 
percent of [B]lack children.”). 
36 See Suzan Burton et al., Marketing Cigarettes When All Else Is 
Unavailable: Evidence of Discounting in Price-Sensitive Neighbourhoods, 23 
TOBACCO CONTROL e24 (2014) (examining cigarette price variations in the 
Australian market and its impact on smoking habits among certain groups).  
37 See generally Dale S. Mantey et al., Exposure to Point-of-Sale 
Marketing of Cigarettes and E-Cigarettes as Predictors of Smoking Cessation 
Behaviors, 21 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 212 (2019). 
38 Amanda L. Dauphinee et al., Racial Differences in Cigarette Brand 
Recognition and Impact on Youth Smoking, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 170, 174 
(2013).  
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B. Disparities in Use and Disease 
There is some evidence that menthol cigarettes pose 
more negative consequences to smokers than non-mentholated 
cigarettes.  These negative traits center around menthol cig-
arettes’ addictiveness and menthol smokers’ ability to quit 
smoking.  First, menthol flavoring in cigarettes seems to en-
courage smoking initiation.  Tobacco companies added menthol 
to cigarettes to mask the harshness of the smoke, and studies 
have confirmed that menthol cigarettes are easier to start 
smoking.39  This is especially true in the context of youth 
smoking.  In fact, tobacco companies were specifically aware 
that younger and less experienced smokers had a low 
tolerance for the irritation from nicotine and the taste of 
tobacco.40  A tobacco company’s own internal study from 1976 
found that the cooling effect of menthol reduced the “nasal 
sting, tongue bite, and harshness” of tobacco.41  While overall 
youth smoking rates have been on a downward trajectory, youth 
smoking rates of menthol have risen by almost ten percent 
since 2008.42  
                                               
39 See James Nonnemaker et al., Initiation with Menthol Cigarettes 
and Youth Smoking Uptake, 108 ADDICTION 171, 172 (2013) (“Youth who 
begin smoking menthol cigarettes are more likely than youth who begin 
smoking non-menthol cigarettes to progress to established smoking.”); see 
also Geoffrey M. Curtin et al., Measures of Initiation and Progression to 
Increased Smoking Among Current Menthol Compared to Non-Menthol 
Cigarette Smokers Based on Data from Four U.S. Government Surveys, 70 
REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 446, 448 (2014).  Though there is a 
statistically significant positive relationship between initiating smoking 
with menthol and forming a daily smoking habit, there is no national data 
regarding menthol cigarettes and progression to daily smoking or lifelong 
smoking.  Curtin et al., supra. 
40 Valerie B. Yerger, Menthol’s Potential Effects on Nicotine 
Dependence: A Tobacco Industry Perspective, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL ii29, ii30 
(2011). 
41 Id. at ii30.  
42 Andrea C. Villanti et al., Changes in the Prevalence and Correlates 
of Menthol Cigarette Use in the USA, 2004–2014, 25 TOBACCO CONTROL ii14, 
ii16 (2016).  While menthol smoking rates have always been higher among 
African American youth than rates in other racial groups, the percentage of 
African American youth smoking menthol decreased very slightly (by 1.4 
percent) between 2008 and 2014.  Id.  As of 2014, almost eighty percent of 
African American youth and young adult smokers smoked mentholated 
cigarettes compared to only about fifty-six percent of Hispanic youth smokers 
and about forty-five percent of White youth smokers.  Id. 
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Second, menthol flavoring makes the smoking experience 
more addictive.  While the menthol compound itself is not an 
addictive substance, menthol augments the addictiveness of 
nicotine in tobacco.  Because menthol tempers the harshness 
of cigarettes, smokers inhale more deeply and potentially 
absorb more nicotine.43  Menthol has also been shown to inhibit 
the metabolism of nicotine, thereby increasing nicotine deliv-
ery.44  New research suggests that menthol might even increase 
the number of nicotine receptors in the brain.45  Menthol also 
complements the addictiveness of nicotine in cigarettes by 
offering an accompanying soothing sensation.  Some researchers 
consider the effect menthol has on cold receptors to be another 
addictive property layered onto the nicotine.46 
Third, menthol additives seem to interfere with cessa-
tion—a smoker's ability to quit.  One study found that minorities 
who smoked mentholated cigarettes had lower quit rates than 
minority smokers who smoked regular cigarettes.47  At a broader 
level, researchers have found that youth who start smoking 
mentholated cigarettes are eighty percent more likely to be 
lifelong smokers than those who initiate smoking with non-
mentholated cigarettes.48  Smoking duration tends to be greater 
in the Black male population.49 
A preliminary report issued in 2013 by a Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) scientific committee affirmed all three 
of these addiction-related consequences of menthol additives in 
a sweeping literature review.  The committee reported that 
                                               
43 Jill M. Williams et al., Higher Nicotine and Carbon Monoxide 
Levels in Menthol Cigarette Smokers with and Without Schizophrenia, 9 
NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 873, 874 (2007). 
44 See Kabbani, supra note 10, at 1; see also N.L. Benowitz, Clinical 
Pharmacology of Nicotine: Implications for Understanding, Preventing, and 
Treating Tobacco Addiction, 83 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 
531, 535 (2008). 
45 Matthew F. Thompson et al., Menthol Enhances Nicotine-Induced 
Locomotor Sensitization and In Vivo Functional Connectivity in Adolescence, 
32 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 332, 337–39 (2018). 
46 Pamela I. Clark & Phillip S. Gardiner, Menthol Cigarettes: Moving 
Toward a Broader Definition of Harm, 12 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. S85, S87 
(2010). 
47 Id. at S90. 
48 Kabbani, supra note 10, at 1. 
49 Theodore R. Holford et al., Comparison of Smoking History Patterns 
Among African American and White Cohorts in the United States Born 1890 
to 1990, 18 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES.  S16, S27 (2016).  
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“menthol in cigarettes is likely associated with increased ini-
tiation and progression to regular cigarette smoking,” “increased 
dependence,” and “reduced success in smoking cessation, 
especially among African American menthol smokers.”50 
One might think that if African Americans are less likely 
to be able to quit smoking because of mentholated cigarettes’ 
addictive properties and are more likely to smoke late into their 
lives, then smoking mentholated cigarettes creates more sick-
ness and death in the African American population.  However, 
most studies on the difference between mentholated and non-
mentholated cigarettes have thus far not shown a difference in 
the additive’s impact on tobacco-related disease or mortality.51  
For example, one study found that there was no significant 
difference in lung cancer rates between smokers of mentholated 
and non-mentholated cigarettes.52  Other research found that 
smokers of mentholated cigarettes faced no increased risks of 
cardiovascular disease.53  However, it is not clear how much can 
be inferred from the absence of scientific findings linking 
smoking of mentholated cigarettes to tobacco-related disease.54  
There is, for example, evidence that the smoke of mentholated 
cigarettes contains up to twenty percent more fine particles 
than non-mentholated cigarettes.55  Exposure to fine particles 
increases one’s risk of a heart attack, even at the low levels 
seen in outdoor air pollution.56  Smokers of mentholated ciga-
                                               
50 FDA, PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBLE PUBLIC 




51 Allison C. Hoffman, The Health Effects of Menthol Cigarettes as 
Compared to Non-Menthol Cigarettes, 9 TOBACCO INDUCED DISEASES S7, S12 
(2011).  
52 William J. Blot et al., Lung Cancer Risk Among Smokers of Menthol 
Cigarettes, 103 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 810 (2011) (finding no increased risk 
of lung cancer from mentholated cigarettes alone).  
53 Heather M. Munro et al., Menthol and Non-Menthol Cigarette 
Smoking: All-Cause, Cardiovascular Disease and Other Causes of Death 
Among Blacks and Whites, 133 CIRCULATION 1861, 1864 (2016). 
54 Linda A. Alexander et al., Why We Must Continue to Investigate 
Menthol’s Role in the African American Smoking Paradox, 18 NICOTINE & 
TOBACCO RES. S91, S91 (2016). 
55 Youn O. Lee & Stanton A. Glantz, Menthol: Putting the Pieces 
Together, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL ii1, ii5 (2011).   
56 Id. 
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rettes can also face more exposure to the toxic effects of carbon 
monoxide than smokers of non-mentholated cigarettes.57 
The current lack of scientific evidence that mentholated 
cigarettes produce more tobacco-related disease does not mean 
that there is no material harm that stems from the tobacco 
industry’s racial targeting.  Tobacco-related health disparities 
exist even where smoking rates are the same.  African American 
smokers live fewer years than White smokers, and more African 
American deaths are attributable to smoking.58  The marketing 
practices of menthol cigarette makers have created a demand 
within the African American population, a medically vulnerable 
group that suffers a disproportionate burden of chronic disease.59  
In fact, African Americans face more tobacco-related disease 
and death even though they smoke at the same rate as White 
Americans.  Academics refer to this higher disease and death 
burden from tobacco-related illnesses as the “African American 
smoking paradox.” 
For example, all African Americans—not just those who 
smoke—are more likely to get lung cancer (Whites have an 
incidence rate of 64.4 in 100,000 for the disease, while 74.7 
African Americans per every 100,000 get lung cancer).60  
Compounding this disparity is the fact that African Americans 
receive less effective medical treatment for their illnesses.61  In 
the context of lung cancer, African Americans who are diagnosed 
with the disease face shorter survival times than White lung 
cancer patients.62  African Americans already face discrimina-
tion in health care treatment, limited access to care, exposure 
to environmental harms, residential segregation, and higher 
                                               
57 See generally M.E. Jarvik et al, Mentholated Cigarettes Decrease 
Puff Volume of Smoke and Increase Carbon Monoxide Absorption, 56 
PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 563 (1994). 
58 Ho & Elo, supra note 7, at 2.  
59 Alexander et al., supra note 54 (including diseases like heart disease, 
stroke, hypertension, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and lung cancer). 
60 AM. LUNG ASS’N, TOO MANY CASES, TOO MANY DEATHS: LUNG CANCER 
IN AFRICAN AMERICANS (2010).   
61 Elyse R. Park et al., Disparities Between Blacks and Whites in 
Tobacco and Lung Cancer Treatment, 16 ONCOLOGIST 1428, 1431 (2011).   
62 Sarah Miller, Lung Cancer and African Americans, CANCER 
PREVENTION & TREATMENT FUND, http://stopcancerfund.org/p-lung-cancer/ 
lung-cancer-and-african-americans/ [https://perma.cc/X66N-VU9W].  
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poverty rates—conditions that predict disease.63  Racially 
targeted marketing of mentholated cigarettes that seeks to 
make smoking more attractive to African Americans further 
exacerbates existing health disparities.  
 
III. INADEQUACY OF EXISTING LEGAL TOOLS IN 
REGULATING MENTHOL MARKETING 
While lawyers, lawmakers, and public policy officials 
have shown great interest in reducing smoking throughout 
the population and have undertaken efforts to rein in the 
ubiquitous and pervasive marketing of the tobacco industry, 
none of the major regulatory strategies since the mass tort 
litigation of the late 1990’s touch the problem of the racially 
disparate marketing of menthol cigarettes. 
 
A. The Master Settlement Agreement from State-
Driven Tobacco Legislation 
For as long as they could, tobacco companies publicly 
maintained that their products were neither dangerous nor 
addictive.  Industry spokespeople adhered to these claims for 
decades in the face of mounting medical research that affirmed 
the addictive properties of nicotine and connected smoking to 
lung cancer.  Leaked documents, delivered to a professor by a 
whistleblower in 1994, showed that the industry deliberately 
sold cigarettes for their addictive nicotine content.64  States acted 
on this information and sued tobacco companies.65  Specifically, 
they wanted to recoup the costs that state governments had 
expended in treating tobacco-related diseases.  While the law-
suits focused on the health consequences of the product and 
the deception of consumers, they were vindicating fiscal injuries 
sustained by the state.  By 1998, forty-six states had signed a 
Master Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”). 
                                               
63  Michael Marmot et al., Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health 
Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health, 372 LANCET 
1661, 1661 (2008).  
64 Tobacco Litigation Documents, U.C.S.F. LIBR., https://www.industry 
documentslibrary.ucsf.edu/tobacco/research-tools/litigation-documents/ [https: 
//perma.cc/J7CC-TGBY].  
65 Tobacco Control Litigation, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., https://www.public 
healthlawcenter.org/topics/tobacco-control/tobacco-control-litigation [https:// 
perma.cc/VU83-B7PP].  
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In addition to requiring tobacco companies to pay states 
$246 billion over twenty-five years,66 the provisions of the MSA 
were mostly concerned with tobacco companies advertising to 
youth of all races.  The MSA prohibits the industry from 
advertising on television, sponsoring athletic teams and leagues, 
and using cartoons in advertising.67  The agreement exempts 
adult-only facilities from these advertising restrictions.  
The settlement agreement adopts no race-based ad-
vertising restrictions, nor does it even acknowledge the practice 
of racially targeted marketing.  As one law student described 
the MSA, “[i]n its monochromatic approach to marketing, 
education, and treatment . . . the settlement neglected to 
address the industry’s outstanding obligation to racial and 
ethnic minority communities.”68  In fact, state attorneys 
general told the student author in interviews that they had 
neither discussed nor considered the unique and outsized 
public health harms minority communities sustained as a 
result of racialized marketing and higher tobacco use.69  The 
author even suggested that by closing off advertising and growth 
opportunities in youth markets, the MSA may have indirectly 
exacerbated the problem of racially targeted marketing: “Closing 
other corridors for tobacco companies puts them under 
greater pressure to seek out customers belonging to minority 
communities.”70  
Some evidence bears out this claim.  In the two years 
after the MSA was executed, Newport, a popular manufacturer 
of mentholated cigarettes, increased its advertising in youth 
magazines by thirteen percent (from $5.3 million to $6 million).71  
In the six years after the MSA, mentholated brands went 
from spending thirteen percent of the industry’s total magazine 
                                               
66 15 Years Later, Where Did All the Cigarette Money Go?, NPR (Oct. 
13, 2013), https://www.npr.org/2013/10/13/233449505/15-years-later-where 
-did-all-the-cigarette-money-go [https://perma.cc/YWT3-M7AH]. 
67 Master Settlement Agreement, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., http://www. 
publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/master-settlement-
agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2DZ-2YTQ]. 
68 Danny David, Three Paths to Justice: New Approaches to Minority-
Instituted Tobacco Litigation, 15 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 185, 210 (1999). 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 210 n.142. 
71 Charles King III & Michael Siegel, The Master Settlement 
Agreement with the Tobacco Industry and Advertising in Magazines, 345 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 504, 507 (2001). 
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advertisement expenditures to seventy-seven percent.72  Public 
health researchers observed that in spite of the MSA’s efforts 
to curb––even eliminate––youth smoking, tobacco companies 
consolidated their brand advertising to focus on flavored 
cigarettes, including menthol, which are popular with youth 
and young adults.73  Eventually, widespread public backlash 
forced the industry to scale back its youth-targeted advertising 
operations.74  As mentholated cigarette makers have injected 
more and more dollars into advertising, their share of the market 
has climbed.75  This history suggests that the MSA not only 
failed to address the targeted marketing of menthol cigarettes 
specifically, but also that the settlement indirectly empowered 
menthol and other flavored cigarette brands.  
The MSA’s prohibitions on youth advertising and its 
funding for anti-smoking advertising76 played some role in 
reducing the youth smoking rate—almost forty percent of 
American high school students smoked in the mid-nineties, 
but that number fell to fifteen percent by 2014.77  However, 
the MSA left untouched the problem of race-based cigarette 
marketing, and so, twenty years later, one can still observe the 
disparities in menthol cigarette smoking across racial lines. 
 
B. Congressional Inaction on Menthol  
The next window of opportunity for comprehensive race-
conscious tobacco regulation came when the FDA took juris-
diction over tobacco products in 2009.  The Family Smoking 
                                               
72 Hillel R. Alpert et al., After the Master Settlement Agreement: 
Targeting and Exposure of Youth to Magazine Tobacco Advertising, 27 HEALTH 
AFF. w503, w509 (2008).  
73 Id.  
74 W. Hamilton et al., Cigarette Advertising in Magazines: The 
Tobacco Industry Response to the Master Settlement Agreement and to 
Public Pressure, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL ii54, ii56 (2002).  
75 Anushree Sharma et al., Trends in Market Share of Leading 
Cigarette Brands in the USA: National Survey on Drug Use and Health 
2002–2013, 6 BMJ OPEN e008813, e008814 (2016). 
76 See Melanie Wakefield et al., Effects of Anti-Smoking Advertising 
on Youth Smoking: A Review, 8 J. HEALTH COMM. 229, 239 (2003) (showing 
that anti-smoking advertising funded through the settlement had capacity 
to influence teen smoking behavior).  
77 Adolescents and Tobacco: Trends, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/ 
ash/oah/adolescent-development/substance-use/tobacco/trends/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/B94F-2QPU].  
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Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the “FSPTCA”) was a 
landmark piece of legislation that established product re-
strictions and gave the FDA authority to set product standards 
and regulate marketing.  In the FSPTCA, Congress banned all 
flavor additives, including clove and fruit flavors, but it did not 
ban menthol.78 
Congress’s omission of menthol from the flavor ban 
was a political compromise.79  Lawmakers assumed that the 
FSPTCA’s viability hinged on backing from tobacco companies, 
who might have pulled support if the flavor ban extended to 
menthol.  Furthermore, because of menthol cigarette companies’ 
longtime support for Black politicians and civic life in Black 
communities, there was discord amongst the Congressional 
Black Caucus about the inclusion of menthol in the flavor ban.80 
In addition to holding back on the menthol additive 
ban, Congress declined to adopt more incremental provisions 
on the racially targeted marketing of menthol cigarettes.  To 
deal with menthol, Congress passed the buck to the FDA, 
instructing the agency to research race-based disparities in 
menthol and consider a menthol ban in the future.81 
 
C. FDA Inertia on Menthol 
While Congress excluded a menthol ban from the text 
of the FSPTCA, it did instruct the FDA to evaluate the public 
health risks of mentholated tobacco products shortly after the 
agency assumed regulatory authority over tobacco.  Congress 
tasked the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee 
with reporting on the public health risks posed by the use of 
menthol cigarettes, identifying their impact on African 
Americans specifically.82  The menthol subsection of the statute 
required the Committee to issue its report and a recommen-
dation within a year of the committee’s establishment.  
                                               
78 21 U.S.C. § 387g(a)(1)(A) (2018). 
79 Stephanie Saul, Blacks in Congress Split over Menthol Cigarettes, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/25/business 
/25menthol.html [https://perma.cc/2SJQ-63R4]. 
80 David, supra note 68, at 186.  
81 Michael Freiberg, The Minty Taste of Death: State and Local 
Options to Regulate Menthol in Tobacco Products, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 949, 
952 (2015) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 387g(e)(1) (2012)). 
82 21 U.S.C. § 387g(e)(1). 
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In July of 2011, the Committee found that eliminating 
menthol cigarettes from the marketplace would improve public 
health, as its literature review had affirmed increased initiation 
and progression to regular smoking and decreased cessation in 
smokers of mentholated cigarettes.83  In 2013, the agency issued 
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), con-
templating several new regulations on menthol in acknowl-
edgement of the additive’s danger to public health.84  The 
ANPRM solicited comments on potential new limits or a ban 
on menthol flavoring in cigarettes and new limits on menthol 
in non-cigarette tobacco products.85 
The FDA has yet to issue a final rule on menthol related 
to its 2013 ANPRM.  In August of 2017, eight Senate Democrats 
wrote a letter to FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb urging the 
agency to address its continued delay on the issue, a part of 
which is the targeted marketing of menthol towards African 
American consumers.86  The lawmakers asked the agency to 
identify the steps it had taken since the ANPRM in 2013 to 
“address the risk of menthol,” the cause of delay in the final 
rulemaking, and a timeline for final regulations on menthol.87 
The FDA pulled two88 menthol cigarettes from the 
market in September of 2015.89  The FSPTCA allows the agency 
to ban the release and sale of—or withdraw from the market—
new tobacco products that varied too much from previously 
approved cigarettes marketed in 2007.90  The FDA found that 
the two menthol cigarette products were not substantially 
                                               
83 FDA, supra note 50, at 3 (“[R]emoval of menthol cigarettes from 
the marketplace would benefit public health in the United States.”).  
84 Menthol in Cigarettes, Tobacco Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 44484 
(proposed July 24, 2013). 
85 Id.  
86 Letter from Edward J. Markey, Senator, to Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, 
FDA (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/letter 
%20to%20Dr.%20Gottlieb%20on%20menthol.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT86-Z 
S8V]. 
87 Id. at 2.   
88 These cigarettes were the Camel Crush Bold and the Pall Mall 
Deep Set Recessed Filter Menthol. 
89 See Press Release, FDA, FDA Issues Orders That Will Stop 
Further U.S. Sale and Distribution of Four R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 
Cigarette Products (Sept. 15, 2015), https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993 
/20170406152122/https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnou
ncements/ucm462407.htm [https://perma.cc/DW7Q-9494]. 
90 21 U.S.C. § 387(j) (2018).  
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equivalent to their predicates, as the agency had previously 
represented, but rather “introduced new public health risks.”  
While the FDA prevented new tobacco products from exacer-
bating public health dangers, these orders did nothing to address 
the widespread and disparate use of menthol already out in 
the market. 
At the start of the new presidential administration, the 
agency announced a new comprehensive regulatory plan with 
a less skeptical attitude towards menthol additives.  Rather 
than focusing on the harm menthol introduces to cigarettes, 
the FDA planned to release new ANPRMs that would contem-
plate the utility of menthol in nicotine delivery products that 
are less harmful than cigarettes.91  However, in March 2018, 
the FDA issued an ANPRM seeking comments on product 
standards, restrictions, and distribution of flavored tobacco 
products in acknowledgement of flavor additives’ propensity 
to increase tobacco use in youth.92  Finally, in November 2018, 
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb released a statement that said 
that the agency will move forward and propose a rule to ban all 
menthol flavors in combustible cigarettes.93  While the proposed 
ban on menthol would take menthol cigarettes off the market, 
it did not speak to the racial disparity issues that have developed 
over the course of decades.  And in any case, Commissioner Scott 
Gottlieb abruptly announced his resignation on March 5, 
2019.94  It is unclear how much further the FDA’s tobacco control 
initiatives will move under new leadership.   
 
                                               
91 See Press Release, FDA, FDA Announces Comprehensive 
Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of Tobacco-Related Disease, Death (July 
28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce 
ments/ucm568923.htm [https://perma.cc/5HW7-2M94]. 
92 Regulation of Flavors in Tobacco Products, 83 Fed. Reg. 12294 
(proposed Mar. 21, 2018). 
93 Press Release, Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, FDA, Statement from 
FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Proposed New Steps to Protect 
Youth by Preventing Access to Flavored Tobacco Products and Banning 
Menthol in Cigarettes (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm625884.htm [https://perma.cc/5W69-
XR8X]. 
94 Sheila Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, F.D.A. Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, 
Who Fought Teenage Vaping, Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), 
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D. Past Civil Rights Lawsuits Have Been Unsuccessful 
Prior to the Tobacco Control Act, minority plaintiffs had 
tried to raise civil rights claims against menthol tobacco makers 
for their targeted marketing of African Americans and the 
resultant disparities in tobacco-related death and disease.  In 
Brown v. Philip Morris, Reverend Jesse Brown and “Black 
Smokers,” who were members of an advocacy group called the 
Uptown Coalition for Tobacco Control and Healing in 
Philadelphia, filed a lawsuit against menthol tobacco makers 
on behalf of all living African Americans.95  The claims were 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985, which 
codify the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871.96  Section 1981 
intended to give all citizens in every state the same rights to 
make and enforce contracts, while § 1982 intended to afford all 
citizens the right to buy, sell, and lease property.97  Section 1983 
provides a private right of action to citizens who have sustained 
civil rights injuries from government action, and § 1985 also 
grants citizens the right to sue over deprivations of rights 
coordinated by the government.98  
The tobacco company defendants conceded to the racially 
targeted marketing the plaintiffs described in their complaint, 
and the plaintiffs offered some evidence that menthol cigarettes 
were more addictive.99  Nonetheless, the district court granted 
the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under the civil rights provisions.  
The district court drew on a long line of precedent holding 
that discriminatory advertising claims were not cognizable 
under §§ 1981 and 1982, which only recognize discrimination 
that impedes the enforcement of contracts or the sale of real 
property or causes African Americans and Whites to be offered 
different products.100  Here, of course, the problem was not that 
African Americans were excluded from a transaction, but that 
they were targeted for it.  While previous plaintiffs had won some 
                                               
95 Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 98-cv-005518, 1999 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14495 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 1999), aff'd, 250 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 2001).  
96 Id.  
97 Id. at *18–19.  
98 Id. at *31–32, 42–43.  
99 See id. at *5 n.1 (alleging that mentholated cigarettes delivered 
more nicotine to the smoker than non-mentholated cigarettes and that 
menthol was a toxic substance with its own health harms). 
100 Id. at *20–26. 
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cases in which defective products were sold to African Americans 
deliberately, the district court found that there was no 
difference between the menthol cigarette products smoked by 
African Americans and Whites.  The district court also dismissed 
plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims for due process and equal protection 
violations because the tobacco companies had not undertaken 
their advertising practices under the color of state law.101 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the advertisements 
Philip Morris directed at African American communities 
contained misrepresentations about the safety of menthol 
cigarettes, that the marketing practices violated the “full and 
equal benefit” clause of § 1981, and importantly, that Philip 
Morris’s practices were analogous to those of predatory home 
sellers in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.,102 who sold homes 
to African Americans at grossly inflated prices.103  The Third 
Circuit rejected the analogy, because in Clark, “the defendants 
sold houses to Black purchasers on substantially different and 
more onerous terms than to others, effectively creating two 
separate, racially-segregated markets. . . .  Black Smokers, 
however, point to no such disparities in the sale of mentholated 
tobacco products . . . .”104  
The majority felt that what the Black Smokers were 
really concerned with was advertising, and §§ 1981 and 1982 
did not reach discriminatory advertising, even in the case of 
housing, a sphere in which Congress unambiguously wanted 
to purge discriminatory behavior.105  To address such conduct, 
Congress had to pass separate statutes (like the Fair Housing 
Act) prohibiting steering and predatory transacting.  This case 
came to the courts seven years before the financial crisis hit 
and the underbelly of racially predatory subprime lending 
unearthed itself.  In Part III, this Note explains that in the post-
crisis housing cases (mostly involving reverse redlining), courts’ 
interpretation of discrimination in marketing is more in line 
                                               
101 Id. at *31–32.  
102 Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 333 (7th Cir. 1974). 
103 See id. at 328, 331.  The premise of the Clark plaintiffs’ claim 
was that the housing market in Chicago was completely segmented into 
White and Black.  Plaintiffs advanced an exploitation theory in which home-
sellers charged extraordinary prices to minorities who were locked into the 
“black” market.  
104 Brown, 250 F.3d at 799.  
105 Id. at 799–800. 
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with the housing analogy the Black Smokers unsuccessfully 
asserted. 
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal 
order in 2001.106  But one of the three panel judges dissented, 
arguing that §§ 1981 and 1982 protect more than just the right 
to transact.  The provisions protect the right of African 
Americans to transact with the same opportunities and options 
that White Americans enjoy.  This, he argued, was why courts 
could find civil rights liability even where sellers did not refuse 
buyers, as happens in racial steering in the housing market.  
Racial steering is the practice of landlords or real estate agents 
pushing prospective residents into certain homes or neighbor-
hoods based on their race.  Normally, this meant discouraging 
African Americans from seeking housing alongside White 
residents by misrepresenting the condition of housing and 
neighborhoods or failing to show available housing.107  Judge 
Milton Shadur, a judge in the Northern District of Illinois, wrote 
the following for the Third Circuit:   
 
What must be understood instead is that both 
Section 1981 and Section 1982 are not at all 
limited by their terms to the outright deprivation 
of the Black community’s right to contract.  
Instead each of those statutes mandates an equal 
playing field that is violated by conduct that 
imposes different and race-discriminatory con-
ditions (however created) on the exercise of 
seemingly comparable contractual rights: Sec-
tion 1981 guarantees to Black Smokers “the 
same right . . . to make . . . contracts . . . as is 
enjoyed by [W]hite citizens,” while Section 1982 
assures to Black Smokers “the same right . . . as 
is enjoyed by [W]hite citizens . . . to . . . 
purchase . . . personal property.”  And that is the 
gravamen of the Complaint—that by the tobacco 
companies’ deliberate and successful targeting 
of Black Smokers to persuade them to purchase 
and smoke the concededly more dangerous 
menthol cigarettes and smokeless tobacco—
conduct whose actionability is akin to the 
prohibition of actual “steering” under the Fair 
                                               
106 Id. at 800.  
107 George Galster, Racial Steering in Urban Housing Markets: A 
Review of the Audit Evidence, 18 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 105, 105 (1990).    
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Housing Act—those companies have impaired 
that equality of rights.108 
 
The failure of the Black Smokers in Brown shows the 
inadequacy of existing civil rights law to address the harms 
that stem from racially targeted marketing and the market 
segmentation fostered by tobacco companies.  A new statutory 
framework is needed, and it should draw on the protections 
afforded to consumers in the housing and mortgage markets.  
 
IV. REGULATING TOBACCO MARKETING WITH AN 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISION 
It can be challenging to articulate how targeted mar-
keting practices create civil rights injuries for two reasons.  First, 
targeted marketing is not only commonplace in the realm of 
advertising—it is almost the very essence of present-day 
marketing.  Second, few of our current consumer protection laws 
sanction companies for trying to increase the probability of 
transactions with a certain demographic.  Antidiscrimination 
laws that concern themselves with how products are marketed 
were enacted to prohibit companies or sellers from fencing 
minority consumers out or denying transactions.109  Where laws 
create liability even when the transaction goes through, the 
offending conduct is often fraud or misrepresentation.110  These 
statutes are not antidiscrimination laws in nature.  
However, the Fair Housing Act111 (FHA) and the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act112 (ECOA) are two examples of civil 
rights statutes that create liability for targeting minority 
consumers for certain kinds of products.  While Congress passed 
these statutes to expand minorities’ access to credit and housing 
                                               
108 Brown, 250 F.3d at 807–08. 
109 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2018) (contemplating discriminators 
making housing unavailable, denying housing, or refusing to rent or sell).  
110 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2018) (empowering the Consumer 
Finance Protection Bureau to bring civil actions against regulated entities 
for unfair, abusive, and deceptive practices); see also Donald M. Zupanec, 
Annotation, Practices Forbidden by State Deceptive Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R.3d 449 (1979 & Supp. 2000) (showing 
that every state has a consumer protection law that prohibits unfair and 
deceptive practices). 
111 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2018). 
112 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. (2018). 
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and to reduce residential segregation, cases from the 2000’s—
the years leading up to and immediately following the financial 
crisis—show that the statutes are responsive to the affirmative 
and racially targeted marketing of predatory and subprime 
loans.113  In other words, because of the protections for con-
sumers in the FHA and ECOA, courts have been able to 
overcome the challenges to finding liability for the targeted 
marketing described above.  For this reason, this Note relies on 
these consumer protection statutes to propose an antidiscrim-
ination statute for tobacco products that could sanction the 
racially targeted marketing practices of mentholated cigarettes.  
This Note explores the FHA and ECOA precedent from subprime 
lending cases to demonstrate how courts advance an under-
standing of the harms of affirmative marketing that can be 
applied to tobacco regulation.  
 
A. Liability for Targeted Marketing Under the Fair 
Housing Act 
Congress passed the FHA in 1968 with the broad goal 
of eliminating residential segregation and promoting racial 
integration.  The FHA would seek to accomplish this by banning 
outright exclusion of persons from housing because of their 
race or other protected characteristic and by creating liability 
in the private market when sellers or landlords tried to allocate 
housing based on race.114  Courts interpreted the FHA expan-
sively, supporting that reading with the acknowledgement that 
Congress wished to end residential segregation in housing to 
combat the poor living conditions, concentrated violence, and 
physical isolation suffered by African Americans.115 
The FHA contains several provisions that touch on 
racial preferences in advertising and marketing for housing.  
First, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) directly prohibits discriminatory 
advertising that communicates a preference based on any 
                                               
113 See, e.g., Matthews v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 
2d 874, 887–88 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (finding that defendants’ targeting of elderly 
women for high-cost home equity loans constituted violations of the FHA and 
ECOA). 
114 Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights 
of Occupants Under the Fair Housing Act, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 28 
(2008).  
115 Id. at 30, 31 (citing Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. 
Supp. 489, 496–97 (S.D. Ohio 1976)).  
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protected characteristic.  It makes it unlawful “[t]o make, print, 
or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any 
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or 
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, 
or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any 
such preference, limitation, or discrimination.”116   
Advertising that targets certain racial groups can become 
a violation of other FHA provisions.  Section 3604(a) makes it 
unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona 
fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or 
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national 
origin.”  Courts have read this provision to prohibit racial “ste-
ering,” which occurs when real estate brokers try to influence 
buyers toward or away from certain neighborhoods or housing, 
even though steering is not a direct denial of a transaction.117  
Ordinarily, liability for steering arises when brokers attempt 
to dissuade potential buyers from following through on a 
transaction because of their race.  However, courts have found 
liability for steering in housing when real estate listing services 
selectively advertise housing to a particular race and therefore 
further entrench racial segregation.118  In other words, the FHA 
punishes the practice of attracting people to homes because of 
their race, not just discouraging them from purchasing certain 
homes.  
Section 3604(b) makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate 
against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or 
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, 
sex, familial status, or national origin.”  For this Note’s purposes, 
it will discuss cases that declare “reverse redlining,” or the 
singling out of minority homebuyers for subprime or predatory 
mortgages, to be a violation of § 3604(b). 
                                               
116 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2018).  
117 Neil C. Bruce, Real Estate Steering and the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, 12 TULSA L. REV. 758, 761 (1977).  
118 In Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977), a violation of 
§ 3604(a) was shown by evidence that a White couple who sought housing 
in an apartment complex that was only half White-occupied was steered to 
an all-White complex also owned by the defendant management company. 
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Subprime home loans were a niche market until they 
widely expanded in the 1990’s.119  Among all mortgages, the 
percentage of subprime mortgages reached its peak in 2006.120  
A critical feature of subprime lending was banks’ targeting of 
minority borrowers.  Economic research confirms that between 
2004 and 2007, African Americans were 105 percent more 
likely to borrow from a high-risk lender than White borrowers.121  
One can consider the phenomenon of reverse redlining to be 
the combination of these two things: the rise of subprime and 
predatory lending122 and banks’ active concentration of those 
home loan products in minority communities.   
Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corporation, liti-
gated in 2001, was one of the first cases in which a court 
recognized reverse redlining as a violation of the FHA under 
§ 3604(b).123  The Hargraves plaintiffs argued that Capital City 
Mortgage targeted African Americans in the Washington, D.C. 
area for predatory loans that were designed to fail.124  Denying 
Capital City Mortgage’s motion for summary judgment on the 
FHA claims, the court wrote: 
 
In order to show a claim based on reverse red-
lining, the plaintiffs must show that the defend-
ants’ lending practices and loan terms were 
“unfair” and “predatory,” and that the defendants 
either intentionally targeted on the basis of race, 
                                               
119 Stuart R. Berkowtiz, The Subprime Mortgage Mess—A Primer 
to Assist Investors: This Article Discusses the Subprime Mortgage Crisis from 
the Viewpoint of Investors and Suggests Legal Remedies, 64 J. MO. B. 122, 
123 (2008). 
120 See generally Jacob W. Faber, Racial Dynamics of Subprime 
Mortgage Lending at the Peak, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 328 (2013).  
121 Patrick Bayer et al., What Drives Racial and Ethnic Differences 
in High Cost Mortgages? The Role of High Risk Lenders (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22004, 2016) (examining racial and 
ethnic differences in subprime lending in seven diverse metropolitan areas 
from 2004 to 2007).  
122 While subprime lending does not necessarily involve predatory 
practices, there is significant overlap in subprime lending and predatory 
lending.  See Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized 
Consumer Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL'Y 121, 127–29 (2009). 
123 Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 
(D.D.C. 2000), on reconsideration in part, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001). 
124 Id. at 20–21. 
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or that there is a disparate impact on the basis of 
race.125  
 
There are two notable features of this two-pronged test, 
whereby plaintiffs must show the product is predatory, and 
then show discrimination.  Under the first prong, plaintiffs need 
not show that defendants sold a different kind of product to 
non-minority consumers in order to prove that the product is 
predatory.  To require plaintiffs to come to court with proof that 
the defendants transacted with White customers differently 
would be to permit injustice “so long as it is visited exclusively 
on negroes.”126  In reverse redlining cases, loans are deemed 
“predatory” or “unfair” based on their intrinsic characteristics 
or the practices that lenders and brokers use in the transaction.  
The Hargraves court recognized several characteristics that 
could make a mortgage predatory, including “exorbitant interest 
rates, lending based on the value of the asset securing the loan 
rather than a borrower’s ability to repay,” “‘churning’ loans 
through multiple foreclosures on the same property,” “and 
loan servicing procedures in which excessive fees are charged.”127  
To the extent that many of these practices—like higher interest 
rates and excessive fees—function to lock the debtor into a longer 
relationship with the lender, ultimately increasing profits to 
the lender, the predatory nature of loans made through reverse 
redlining bears similarity to cigarettes.  As described in Part II, 
youth who initiate smoking with menthol cigarettes are far 
more likely to become lifelong smokers than youth who start 
with non-mentholated cigarettes.128  Several studies have shown 
that smokers of mentholated cigarettes are less successful at 
quitting than smokers of non-mentholated cigarettes.129 
Under the second prong, plaintiffs can demonstrate in-
tentional discrimination by showing evidence of targeted 
advertising and marketing practices.  Taken together, these two 
features of the Hargraves decision mean that even if defendants 
sell the same product to White consumers, plaintiffs have an 
                                               
125  Id. (quoting Jackson v. City of Okaloosa, 21 F.3d 1531, 1541 
(11th Cir. 1994) (establishing the availability of disparate impact claims for 
violations of the FHA)).  
126 Id. at 20 (quoting Contract Buyers League v. F&F Inv., 300 F. 
Supp. 210, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1969)).  
127 Id. at 18, 20–21.  
128 Kabbani, supra note 10, at 1.  
129 Clark & Gardiner, supra note 46, at S88. 
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antidiscrimination claim so long as they can show they were 
influenced by racially targeted advertising to purchase a pred-
atory product.130  The Hargraves plaintiffs supplied evidence 
to substantiate both intentional discrimination claims and 
disparate impact claims.  The court took note of certain facts the 
plaintiffs offered to show targeting:  
 
As evidence of intent, or targeting, plaintiffs point 
to the defendants’ solicitation of brokers who 
operate predominantly in the [B]lack community, 
their distribution of flyers and advertisements 
in [B]lack communities, the decision to place their 
offices in [B]lack communities, and the fact that 
a picture of Nash standing next to former Mayor 
Marion Barry, Reverend Jesse Jackson, and 
former District of Columbia Councilmember 
Arrington Dixon hung just inside Capital City’s 
office entrance (plaintiffs allege that this was an 
attempt to convey a message to African-Americans 
that Nash could be trusted).131 
  
Other courts adjudicating reverse redlining cases fol-
lowed Hargraves’s consideration of advertising with respect to 
interrogating the discriminatory intent of sellers.  For example, 
in Steed v. EverHome Mortgage, the Eleventh Circuit decided 
to follow the Hargraves test because no other circuit court had 
recognized a reverse redlining claim under the FHA.  In up-
holding the lower court’s grant of defendant-mortgagee’s motion 
for summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit noted the total 
absence of any evidence of racially targeted advertising, which 
the Hargraves court found persuasive.132  The Commonwealth 
                                               
130 Another line of cases applies a slightly different test to identify 
racial discrimination in reverse redlining.  In Matthews v. New Century, the 
court held that a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case by showing that 
(1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) that she applied for and was 
qualified for a loan, (3) that she was given the loan on grossly unfavorable 
terms, and (4) that the lender continues to provide loans to other applicants 
with similar qualifications but on significantly more favorable terms, or that 
the lender intentionally targeted her for an unfair loan.  185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 
886 (S.D. Ohio 2002).  As is true in FHA reverse redlining claims, plaintiffs 
can show intentional targeting through advertising in lieu of demonstrating 
that nonminority borrowers received more favorable mortgages. 
131 Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 21–22. 
132 Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 308 F. App’x 364, 369 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
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Court of Pennsylvania also relied on the Hargraves test in 
McGlawn v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission to 
establish reverse redlining in the absence of state court prec-
edent on the issue.133  In McGlawn, where a mortgage broker 
was seeking judicial review of a state agency determination 
that he violated the state’s human rights law by singling out 
African American borrowers for predatory loans, evidence of 
marketing practices persuaded the court that the broker 
intentionally discriminated against minorities.  The broker 
“engaged in an aggressive marketing plan targeting African 
Americans” in which he advertised extensively in print sources 
and on radio and television channels that were “oriented toward 
African American audiences and readers.”134  One commentator 
described the broker’s practices as building a “cultural affinity 
with the [B]lack borrowers it targeted.”135 
If these predatory lending marketing tactics look famil-
iar, it is because they are strikingly similar to the approaches 
that menthol cigarette makers took to target their product at 
African American consumers.  Tobacco companies first began 
the process by taking out advertisements in magazines and 
newspapers, and on radio and television shows, with predom-
inantly African American audiences.136  Then, tobacco executives 
began courting civil rights leaders and community organiza-
tions, whom they relied upon to earn African Americans’ trust.137  
Menthol cigarette makers also tried to align their product with 
Black cultural identity by sponsoring jazz—and later hip hop—
music festivals.138  And just as subprime lenders did, menthol 
tobacco companies racially target based on geography: menthol 
cigarette retail promotions and discounts overwhelmingly 
cluster in African American neighborhoods.139  Yet, only pred-
atory lenders face civil rights liability for affirmatively 
marketing their products to a protected minority.  
                                               
133 McGlawn v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 891 A.2d 757, 767 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). 
134 Id. at 764, 772. 
135 Carol N. Brown, Intent and Empirics: Race to the Subprime, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 907, 942 (2010). 
136 Hafez & Ling, supra note 20, at 359 (describing the history of 
Brown & Williamson’s ‘‘Kool Mixx’’ campaign for the menthol brand “Kool”). 
137 Anderson, supra note 19, at ii20. 
138 Hafez & Ling, supra note 20, at 359. 
139 Rising & Alexander, supra note 11, at S2. 
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B. Liability for Targeted Marketing Under the ECOA 
Reverse redlining is also actionable under the ECOA, 
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for creditors 
to “discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any 
aspect of a credit transaction, on the basis of race.”  In cases 
where plaintiffs allege that they were rejected for loans or 
credit products because of their race, plaintiffs must show that 
they qualified for the credit product, and that the lender pre-
ferred borrowers of a non-protected race, to make out a prima 
facie case.140  However, in cases involving reverse redlining 
where minority borrowers have been singled out for predatory 
loans, courts have approached the interrogation of discrimina-
tion in a very similar way to the FHA cases.  Just like in cases 
under the FHA, a plaintiff need not show that he or she was 
denied a transaction based on race in order to have a discrim-
ination claim under the ECOA.  For example, in Hargraves, 
where plaintiffs also brought an ECOA claim, the court held 
that the plaintiffs stated a claim for discrimination even though 
they were not denied loans.141  The court found that the same 
predatory lending practices that made out the FHA claim could 
violate the ECOA.  
Courts have also applied the logic of reverse redlining 
claims under the FHA to the ECOA.  In lieu of showing that 
lenders prefer White borrowers or offer better credit products 
to non-minority consumers, ECOA plaintiffs bringing claims 
for reverse redlining can make out a prima facie case for 
intentional discrimination by showing that the defendant 
targeted racial minorities for a predatory credit product.142  
                                               
140 See 2 CAROL V. CLARK, PADRICK’S RESPA, TILA, HOEPA, AND 
ECOA IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: WITH FORMS § 3:32 (2018–2019 ed. 
2018). 
141 Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 23 
(D.D.C. 2000), on reconsideration in part, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2001). 
142 “Courts have thus softened the requirements for establishing a 
prima facie case when reverse-redlining forms the substance of the discrim-
ination claim, and have allowed such plaintiffs to show that they (i) were 
members of a protected class; (ii) applied for and were qualified for the 
housing or the loan; (iii) received grossly unfavorable terms; and (iv) were 
intentionally targeted or intentionally discriminated against.”  M & T Mortg. 
Corp. v. White, 736 F. Supp. 2d 538, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Barkley v. 
Olympia Mortg. Co., 2007 WL 2437810, at *13–15 (Aug. 22, 2017); Matthews 
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Plaintiffs can establish discriminatory targeting by showing 
that defendants advertise or market inferior credit products to 
customers based on race.  In M & T Mortgage Corporation v. 
White, plaintiffs sued a development corporation for selling 
and financing homes that were uninhabitable, contrary to 
representations in the sale contracts.  The court indicated that 
the defendant’s use of African American agents who made it 
their “personal mission” to increase minority homeownership 
could be discriminatory targeting.143  The court stated that 
plaintiffs could also support their claim of intentional targeting 
based on race by showing that the defendant advertised in 
predominantly minority neighborhoods.144 
 
C. Amending the Tobacco Control Act to Add an 
Antidiscrimination Provision 
For the reasons articulated above, one can readily draw 
analogies between the affirmative marketing of predatory loans 
in reverse redlining and the racially targeted marketing of 
menthol cigarettes at African Americans.  Both products—
predatory loans and mentholated cigarettes—are suboptimal 
versions of their originals, prime mortgages and non-mentho-
lated cigarettes.  Predatory home loans are more likely to go 
into default and cost the consumer more than what her credit-
worthiness warrants; mentholated cigarettes are more addictive 
and harder to quit than non-mentholated cigarettes and likely 
lead to longer lifelong smoking.145  Both of these products are 
aggressively targeted at African Americans through the media 
they consume and the neighborhoods they live in.  
                                               
v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 887–88 (S.D. Ohio 2002); 
Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 23.). 
143 The court denied summary judgment motions from both parties 
and stated that the question of intentional targeting was to be left for the 
jury.  Id. at 576. 
144 Id.  
145 Addiction is often used as a metaphor to describe debtors’ rela-
tionship to creditors who trap them into a cycle of borrowing in order to keep 
up with exorbitant interest and fees.  For example, consumer protection 
advocates analogize payday loans to drugs when cash-poor borrowers get 
stuck rolling over loans.  See Bob Sullivan, “Like a Drug”: Payday Loan Users 
Hooked on Quick-Cash Cycle, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2013), https://www.nbc 
news.com/feature/in-plain-sight/drug-payday-loan-users-hooked-quick-cash-
cycle-v18088751 [https://perma.cc/D7LJ-8C3B].  
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Hargraves and its progeny under the FHA and the ECOA 
instruct that racially targeted marketing can be injurious when 
the underlying product is harmful.  And, because there are civil 
rights statutes that take on the goal of ending residential 
segregation, those injuries are legally actionable and can be 
described in civil rights terms.  Congress passed the FHA and 
the ECOA because it recognized that many inequalities spun 
out of one’s inability to choose her home because of her race.146  
Just as establishing a home free from the obstacles of racial 
discrimination in the housing market is critical to living freely 
and fully as a citizen, it is essential that minorities be able to 
maintain bodily health without the discriminatory influences 
of companies that make and market products that kill when 
used as intended.  Health disparities result from myriad factors, 
including society’s tolerance of a particular demographic’s 
exposure to unhealthy agents.  This Note considers companies’ 
targeted promotion of smoking in the African American com-
munity an injustice, and one that contrasts starkly with the 
zealous and enduring nationwide campaign to reduce smoking 
rates.  While racial justice movements have long included 
health-related policies in their platforms,147 and other health-
related legislation takes care to prohibit racial discrimination, 
no laws yet address the civil rights injuries that stem from the 
targeted marketing of mentholated cigarettes.  
Congress should amend the Tobacco Control Act to 
include an antidiscrimination provision modeled after the 
provisions in the FHA and the ECOA that would create liability 
                                               
146 See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496 
(S.D. Ohio 1976) (“In this case, a realistic examination of the concerns that 
led to the adoption of this legislation proves a better guide to congressional 
intent than the dusty volumes of Sutherland on Statutory Interpretation.  
Primary among these concerns were the rioting and civil disturbances that 
had rocked the central cores of many of the nation’s major cities the previous 
summer.  These disturbances had not only focused attention on the discontent 
of the people trapped in the nation’s ghettoes, but had also brought many to 
the realization that the underlying illness, of which the riots of 1967 were 
symptomatic, had to be treated if a worse catastrophe was to be forestalled.  
This, indeed, was the conclusion of the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders appointed by President Johnson in July, 1967.  Its final 
report was released in March, 1968, during the debate on the Civil Rights 
Act, and its findings were a matter of general concern to Congress.”). 
147 Vann R. Newkirk II, The Fight for Health Care Has Always Been 
About Civil Rights, ATLANTIC (June 27, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com 
/politics/archive/2017/06/the-fight-for-health-care-is-really-all-about-civil-
rights/531855/ [https://perma.cc/V8ZC-UDCM]. 
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for the targeted marketing of menthol cigarettes.  The provision 
should prohibit the kinds of practices that menthol cigarette 
makers have used in the past, such as targeting African 
Americans in specific magazines or on the radio, as well as the 
tactics the industry currently uses, which are mostly focused 
on marketing at the point of sale in majority-minority neigh-
borhoods.  For example, the statute could make it unlawful “for 
any manufacturer of mentholated cigarettes to discriminate 
against any consumer, with respect to any aspect of a trans-
action to purchase mentholated cigarettes, on the basis of 
race.”148  
This antidiscrimination provision should be enforceable 
in private actions brought by citizens, just as the antidiscrim-
ination provisions in the FHA and the ECOA allow.  Individuals 
or classes of individuals should be able to establish viable 
claims by providing evidence that they were targeted by ad-
vertisements, discounts, or marketing schemes focused in their 
neighborhoods.  The FHA offers private individuals actual and 
punitive damages if they prevail on their discrimination claims; 
the amendment to the Tobacco Control Act should provide the 
same money damages.  
There are benefits to this statutory solution beyond just 
potentially decreasing the consumption of menthol cigarettes 
within minority groups, which a product or additive ban could 
do.  First, African Americans suffer a dignitary harm when 
society accepts that companies target them for tobacco con-
sumption, especially because there is broad societal and gov-
ernmental opposition to smoking because of its health risks.  
Our current regulatory regime for tobacco is geared to prevent 
some people from smoking, but not all; it is more concerned 
with the longevity of the White and the wealthy than the 
health of minorities.  Universal regulations, like product bans, 
                                               
148 While this Note explores a statutory remedy for the racially 
targeted marketing of menthol cigarettes, borrowing from the FHA, it might 
also be possible to relitigate the §§ 1981–82 discrimination claims first 
raised in the Black Smokers case.  The court in Hargraves deemed reverse 
redlining a cognizable injury under the FHA, but also under § 1982.  However, 
the cases from the subprime lending era are less certain on the applicability 
of § 1982 to factual situations involving reverse redlining.  See Honorable v. 
Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Although 
sections 1981 and 1982 are narrower, they may be construed to prohibit some 
or all of the practices of which the plaintiffs produce evidence here . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
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do not offer a remedy for the indignity African Americans suffer, 
because they touch every consumer in the same way.  
A second benefit of the statutory provision this Note 
proposes for marketing is that it does not face the same obstacles 
as product regulation.  Regulations of the actual tobacco product 
face vehement and formidable opposition from the tobacco in-
dustry, as evidenced by the failure to include menthol in the 2009 
statutory ban and the FDA’s inertia on the matter.  Providing a 
civil rights private right of action is a way to influence tobacco 
consumption and sales without regulating the product specifi-
cally.  Industry opposition to such a provision would be harder 
to defend.  While tobacco companies’ arguments against includ-
ing menthol in the 2009 ban centered on racial paternalism and 
freedom of choice to smoke, an antidiscrimination provision 
would offer aggrieved litigants the chance to bring a lawsuit 
against marketing practices if they chose.  Finally, the statutory 
provision could close the gap in health equality by indirectly 
regulating a behavioral health determinant.  Discouraging the 
disparate use of mentholated cigarettes by prohibiting dis-
crimination in advertising would be more efficient, in terms of 
effort and funds, than promoting and administering smoking 
cessation programs or more localized interventions.  
However, support for such an antidiscrimination regime 
in tobacco regulation would have to overcome some obstacles.  
First, there is the slippery slope counterargument.  Many 
harmful or suboptimal products are aggressively marketed to 
low-income and minority populations.  Fast food and junk food, 
for example, are much more prevalent in minority neighbor-
hoods and they drive up obesity rates.  How far should the 
regulation of products in the name of health equity go?  Should 
such advertising prohibitions apply to every product that 
contributes to a racial health disparity?  The key to addressing 
this concern is the fact that there is no safe level of smoking.  
Unlike makers of beauty products or music, menthol companies 
are singling out a specific population on which to foist a habit 
that is the number one cause of preventable death in the coun-
try.149  Lawmakers have before decided to regulate marketing 
with respect to race when it comes to extremely important parts 
of a person’s wellbeing, such as housing, employment recruiting, 
and credit access.  And while many other products—like fast 
                                               
149 Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, CDC,  https://www.cdc.gov/ 
tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
XPJ5-5MU6] (last updated Feb. 6, 2019).  
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and junk food, soda, and alcohol—might contribute to health 
disparities, safe levels of consumption still exist.  The same 
cannot be said for cigarettes.  
A second concern with this Note’s proposal might be its 
interference with the exercise of liberty.  Cigarettes are legal, 
and the decision to smoke or not smoke—or to smoke a specific 
kind of cigarette—is theoretically up to the adult consumer.  
Would a provision that aims to end racially discriminatory 
marketing simply be taking choices away from autonomous 
adults?  This Note argues that this is not the case.  If anything, 
the status quo of targeting minorities for mentholated ciga-
rettes, which are more addictive and lead to more lifelong 
smoking, prevents consumers from choosing a product across 
the full range of options.  African Americans are currently 
overexposed to the inferior product.  Similar arguments were 
made about predatory subprime loans in the FHA and the 
ECOA cases: because of targeted marketing and promotion of 
subprime loans, African American borrowers simply did not 
know about better credit products.150  Furthermore, there are 
already limitations on choice for other tobacco flavors, which 
Congress simply banned in the 2009 Tobacco Control Act.  
A third obstacle might sound in criticism of the FHA’s 
impotence in the face of entrenched residential segregation: if 
such a lauded statute could secure only modest gains in equality 
between races,151 while the problem of residential isolation for 
minorities persists, why would a similar model work for the 
marketing of cigarettes?  The answer is in the difference be-
tween the housing market, which is dispersed and includes 
many sellers, and the tobacco market, which includes only a 
handful of menthol cigarette makers in the United States.  It 
would be much easier to police the advertising of tobacco 
products to targeted markets than it would be to enforce the 
FHA’s antidiscrimination provisions in each housing-related 
transaction.  
                                               
150 “[B]rokers—and some lenders—frequently targeted minority 
neighborhoods because they assumed residents would respond favorably to 
their pitches for these high-cost loan products.  This is because borrowers 
with few financial options, or those unaware of other options, were more likely 
to take out higher-rate loans through subprime originators working in their 
neighborhoods.”  Fisher, supra note 122, at 148 (footnote omitted). 
151 Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 
SOC. F. 571, 571, 581 (2015).   
No. 4:369]          FROM HOUSING TO HEALTH 405 
 
The fourth obstacle is the First Amendment’s protection 
of commercial speech.  In fact, tobacco companies have previ-
ously sued the FDA over product labeling and advertising 
regulations.152  However, courts have upheld many of the FDA’s 
labeling and marketing provisions to protect youth from smok-
ing initiation, such as the ban on sponsoring athletic or music 
events.  Commercial speech does not have an unlimited runway; 
the government can regulate this speech when it has a sub-
stantial interest and the regulation achieves that substantial 
interest.153  Furthermore, this Note’s proposal does not actually 
proscribe specific content in advertising––it just demands that 
advertising not be discriminatory.  In the employment context, 
for instance, where discrimination is illegal, employers do not 




Menthol cigarettes persist in spite of massive overhauls 
in the regulatory scheme over tobacco more generally, brought 
on by widespread tort litigation, congressional legislation, and 
FDA control.  Its continuance is responsible for the massive 
health disparities between White Americans and African 
Americans, the latter of whom suffer earlier deaths and more 
tobacco-related disease.  Past strategies, including tort litigation, 
civil rights lawsuits, and FDA rulemaking, have proven inef-
fective at both curbing menthol use and stopping tobacco 
companies from targeting advertisements for their products at 
African Americans and other minorities. 
A new regime is needed, and it can be based off of the 
same ideas that undergird consumer protection statutes.  
Statutes like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair 
Housing Act accept that there are some “products”—in credit, 
in particular—that are subpar or more harmful to a consumer, 
                                               
152 Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 
512, 521 (W.D. Ky. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Disc. Tobacco 
City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). 
153 Ross D. Petty et. al., Regulating Target Marketing and Other 
Race-Based Advertising Practices, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 382 (2003). 
154 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 392 (1973); see also Hailes v. United Airlines, 464 
F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).   
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and they prevent directing consumers to those products on the 
basis of race.  An analogous statutory regime for tobacco would 
finally target the core civil rights issue in this realm, which is 
the targeted marketing that produces health inequities.  
 
 
